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Abstract
Objective: Unhealthy food and drink consumption is associated with a range of
physical and mental health concerns. In response, public health policies have
been developed targeting a reduction in obesity in particular. In the present
commentary we argue that government–industry partnerships have reduced the
effectiveness of resultant policies and explore why.
Design: Perspectives of authors.
Setting: UK.
Participants: Populations in the UK; UK Government.
Results: Industry involvement has presented three interrelated challenges for the
UK Government: (i) balancing collaboration while maintaining appropriate
distance from industry stakeholders; (ii) resultant production of ‘watertight’ and
effective legislation or intervention; and (iii) actual or perceived limited
sanctioning or bargaining power.
Conclusions: Industry involvement in public health policy making has led to weak
action. Support with policy implementation (rather than development) and genuine
‘buy-in’ from industry could accelerate the pace of public health improvement.
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Overweight and obesity is a global epidemic, contributing
to 2·8 million deaths per year(1). Described by the WHO as
one of the most ‘visible – yet neglected – public health
problems’(2), preventing and reducing obesity has been
the focus of considerable transnational and national
intervention. In 2018, the WHO’s Time to Deliver report(3)
was critical of progress made against a range of non-
communicable diseases, including obesity, and recom-
mended governments ‘engage constructively with the
private sector’ to strengthen contributions to achieving
public health goals. Building on existing in-depth analyses
of systems for and approaches to obesity-related policy
implementation(4), the current commentary focuses on
learning from the implementation of a specific national
policy, Healthy Lives, Healthy People: A Call to Action on
Obesity in England(5). A notable approach to this policy
has been the UK Government’s engagement with food-
and drink-related industries throughout. Seven years into
this ten-year strategy, we highlight the key challenges
industry engagement has presented, and raise questions
and recommendations for policy makers, public health
organisations and industry itself.
Healthy Lives, Healthy People: A Call to Action on
Obesity in England
Healthy Lives Healthy People: A Call to Action on Obesity
in England(5) (hereafter referred to as ‘the call to action’) is
of particular interest to policy makers and public health
specialists given its bold and explicit aspirations to achieve
both a sustained downward trend in the level of ‘excess
weight’ (wording used in ‘the call to action’) in children by
2020 and a downward trend in the level of ‘excess weight’
averaged across all adults by 2020. This ambition was
aligned with a strategy of collective engagement and shared
responsibility; the policy emphasised roles for a wide range
of stakeholders and delivery partners transcending health,
social care, local authorities and businesses. Explicitly, ‘the
call to action’ aimed to ‘harness the contribution of national
Public Health Nutrition: 22(7), 1326–1329 doi:10.1017/S1368980019000053
*Corresponding author: Email s.w.flint@leedsbeckett.ac.uk © The Authors 2019
partners – including businesses, with creation of responsi-
bility deals, and brokering partnerships with business, civil
society and the voluntary sector’(5).
The UK Government has faced several challenges in
delivering on its strategy for business to take a ‘leading’ or
‘greater’(5) role in obesity prevention and treatment. Here
we focus on three interrelated challenges: (i) balancing
collaboration while maintaining appropriate distance from
industry stakeholders; (ii) resultant production of ‘water-
tight’ and effective legislation or intervention; and (iii)
government’s actual or perceived limited sanctioning or
bargaining power. For each of these challenges, we pre-
sent and critique a specific policy example.
Challenge 1: collaboration without conflict of
interest
Concerns about the difficulties of managing business-
related conflict of interest in public health policy making
are widespread enough for the WHO to require those
signed up to its Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control to protect health policies from commercial and
other vested interests of the tobacco industry(6). In the UK,
the exclusion of the tobacco industry from policy envir-
onments while simultaneously entering into partnerships
with the food and alcohol industries has been criticised(7).
Public–private partnerships are unlikely to be sustained if
interests of government (public health) and industry (sta-
keholder profit) are not equally served(8,9), which raises
issues when these goals are misaligned or directly
conflicting.
To elaborate with one specific example, the UK Gov-
ernment’s 2010 Public Health Responsibility Deal(10) has
been criticised heavily for allowing food and drink brands
to have input during its development. Profit motives are
explicitly recognised: ‘a sound business case’ to ensure
partner commitment is embedded in the logic model of
the policy. However, businesses participating have
reported doing so not only to meet corporate social
responsibility commitments and enhance reputations, but
also to reduce the possibility of regulations(4). While the
former appears worthwhile, such motives are often tran-
sient and a reliance on self-regulation has been criticised
as ineffective across a range of sectors (e.g. chemical
safety(11); tobacco and alcohol(12)). Where this has been
effective (e.g. environmental policy), it has been argued
that this is only due to the maintenance of genuine legis-
lative threat, external monitoring and sanctions(13). This is
not the case with the Public Health Responsibility Deal.
Here, arguments that despite their differing motives, gov-
ernment–food industry partnerships would result in an
enhanced response (e.g. through better collaboration) are
undermined by criticism that eventual outcomes were
weak or inappropriate. For instance, Knai et al.(14) ana-
lysed the effectiveness of the Public Health Responsibility
Deal food pledges – out-of-home energy labelling, salt
reduction, energy reduction, front-of-pack nutrition label-
ling, fruit and vegetable consumption, and saturated fats –
reporting that in most cases pledges were already under-
way, with more structural approaches to improving diet
(e.g. food pricing strategies, marketing restrictions) not
represented. This is at odds with arguments that wider
system change, as opposed to informational interventions
targeting individuals, is necessary for public health
improvement(15). Thus, although the Public Health
Responsibility Deal pledges were lauded as representing a
genuine commitment from industry partners to improving
public health(4), in reality organisations continued with
business as usual.
A related challenge is that the visible involvement of
industry with policy can lead to perceived contradictory
messaging and resultant public confusion. For instance,
where policy informs that high-sugar products are detri-
mental to health (e.g. causing diabetes, tooth decay,
obesity), brands involved in policy development simulta-
neously inform the population that their products can be
healthy or consumed as part of a healthy lifestyle (e.g.
Coca-Cola Co.). The extensive marketing of this message
has been criticised as normalising energy-dense nutrient-
poor food consumption patterns at societal level(16). Ulti-
mately, critics(14) argue that the Public Health Responsi-
bility Deal was fundamentally flawed in expecting industry
to voluntarily act to improve public health while poten-
tially threatening existing business models. In response to
some of this criticism, more recent policy (e.g. Child
Obesity: A Plan of Action) adopts a more robust approach
by, for example, including taxation penalties for high-
sugar products. Appropriately developing and enforcing
such legislation, however, has been another key challenge
for Government.
Challenge 2: developing robust legislation and
regulation
Private partners involved in UK obesity-related policy
openly declared their hopes to reduce the possibility of
regulation(4), and where this was not possible, it was
perhaps inevitable that companies lobbied for strategies to
‘soften’ regulation (e.g. reducing targets or penalties for
non-compliance). This issue can be demonstrated by
viewing the recent UK Government’s Soft Drinks Industry
Levy (SDIL)(17), more commonly known as a ‘sugar tax’.
The SDIL is a policy that ‘will help to reduce sugar in soft
drinks and tackle childhood obesity’(17). Intended to
reduce the sugar content of products as well as reduce
portion sizes, in many instances industry response has
focused on the latter mechanism as opposed to product
reformulation. This might risk greater product consump-
tion through lower satiety and therefore no change in the
ultimate volume of sugar consumed.
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It is unlikely that the Government would not have
considered that industry might not reformulate and thus
reduce the sugar content within products. It is also unli-
kely that it would not have considered that companies
could and would opt to merely absorb the tax themselves
or increase the price of their product to cover this loss.
Adopting softer approaches (e.g. a tax as opposed to
regulating a maximum level) enabled the UK Government
to maintain positive relationships with industry, but
undermined policy aims. Even strong legislation or reg-
ulatory standards are not enough; we must also have a
government willing and able to follow through with
appropriate sanctions to drive compliance(14). This high-
lights a final underlying challenge for Government – how
far it is willing to push industry?
Challenge 3: a perception of limited sanctioning and
bargaining power
Government appears in a difficult negotiating position
when trying to encourage or enforce obesity-related
action. Food and drink industry brands bring many ben-
efits to the UK including contributions to gross domestic
product, employment, and wider investment and spon-
sorship (e.g. of major events). Collaborative working and
genuine ‘buy-in’ from industry could accelerate the pace
of public health improvement; however, history informs
that in relation to public health intervention, pursuing
partnerships rather than adopting a stronger governance
approach reduces effectiveness of policy strategies (e.g.
see effects of cutting ties with tobacco industry). We argue
that currently Government is failing in its responsibility to
the public by prioritising protection against potential loss
of economic or employment-related benefits from industry
over actual and current damage that existing practice has
on public health.
One area where some progress is being made is
regarding marketing of unhealthy foods and drinks. For
instance, the WHO Commission on Ending Childhood
Obesity(18) and Recommendations for Food Marketing and
Non-Alcoholic Beverages(19) both advocate minimising
children’s exposure to the marketing of ‘foods that are
high in saturated fats, trans-fatty acids, free sugars, or salt’
(p. 8)(19). In the UK, policy relating to the marketing of
unhealthy foods and drinks focuses on media placement
restrictions and advertisements for high fat, salt or sugar
products. While commendable for attempting to limit the
presence and influence of industry messaging, policy
could again have been strengthened. For example, Gov-
ernment has yet to adopt the All-Party Parliamentary
Group on Obesity’s recommendations that government
‘implement a 9 pm watershed on advertisement of food
and drink high in fat, sugar and salt’(20) and enforcement
opportunities actioned elsewhere have not been
implemented(21).
Where next?
Relatively little progress in reducing ‘excess weight’ has
been made during the seven years since ‘the call to action’
on obesity in England was released. We argue that this is at
least partially attributed to industry involvement in policy,
resulting in weak action. We recommend: increased use of
legislative powers; limiting industry influence in govern-
ment; and recognising and appropriately rewarding indus-
try behaviour that benefits public health.
1. History tells us that self-regulation among the food and
drink industry does not meet public health objectives(22)
and government involvement counts for little in the
absence of sanctions to drive compliance(14). There is a
need therefore to move beyond expectations and
requests for industry to voluntarily self-regulate, and
instead mandate changes that reduce the abundance of
unhealthy food and drink products in society. Legisla-
tion should be used more widely and effectively across a
range of areas including food content, labelling and
advertising. Methods available include imposing
enforceable duties on bodies in a position to improve
public health, and creating or expanding licensing,
taxation and inspection powers to create leverage(23).
2. Industry influence in policy making must be limited.
Consider what we can learn from the reduction of
industry involvement in other public health topics.
There was once a time when tobacco companies
would have a seat at the top table to contribute to
smoking cessation efforts; this did not work, and it was
only once industry involvement decreased that smok-
ing cessation strategies became more effective. Genu-
ine partnerships or incentives for business can be
maintained where the public health objective is
prioritised foremost (e.g. the Diet and Health Research
Industry Club – government and industry research for
new or reformulated foods)(24). It is also suggested that
public health objectives are set prior to any potential
partnership(7) and that partnerships do not provide
opportunities for renegotiation of objectives, as
observed in the Public Health Responsibility Deal(25).
3. Finally, bold action that celebrates and supports the
promotion of public health should be observed. There
is a focus on identifying and criticising unhealthy food
and drink companies – and rightly so – but we rarely
see celebration of companies that develop, provide
and support healthy behaviours. Government should
provide financial and trading incentives for industries
promoting population health, and in doing so, provide
profit-based incentives for other industry to follow suit.
Conclusion
Intervention to reduce the consumption of unhealthy
foods and drinks, and ultimately ‘excess weight’ in the
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population, remains warranted. While policy such as the
WHO’s Time to Deliver report continues to call for gov-
ernments to ‘work with food and non-alcoholic beverage
companies’, including regulation as an area for coopera-
tive working is unhelpful. Industry has a vital role to play
in enacting policy, but not in the generation of policy or
policy objectives. To be explicit, industry has no compe-
tence in public health and therefore no role in making
public health policy.* To enable meaningful change, Gov-
ernment should strengthen its approach and prioritise the
known impact on population health of unhealthy foods and
drinks over the hypothetical economic impacts of losing
industry favour. The responsibility is the Government’s, and
industry must be made to deal with the consequences.
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